Kosovo Conundrum

My other worry is that the American military is capable of great damage. In Vietnam, not so long ago, we killed at least a million Vietnamese people, maybe 2 million. I would like to prevent the kind of escalation that comes in this situation. In Vietnam, we never had this moment — we never had the moment before ground troops were about to be sent when this was discussed. I think this is an extremely important moment, and this kind of discussion is exactly what we need to prevent that kind of murderous escalation and find other solutions that would result in some kind of partition.

HASANI: Regarding the bombing and the effect it’s having, I absolutely disagree with you. I think that the bombing is having the right effect. This military machine that was built within Yugoslavia — Milosevic took it over, somehow — that’s history. But he has used it to cause a lot of damage. I think it’s very simple when the president says, "We are out to destroy his military machine." Think about it. What we are doing is destroying his capability of waging future war. This guy is willing, as soon as this thing is over, if he stays in power, to do the same thing in Montenegro and Macedonia. I am 100 percent sure that the bombing is doing the right thing. STONE: I think the bombing could work, and, I think, we have to remember that part of the decision-making process for NATO was based on Bosnia, and in Bosnia, after three days of bombing Bosnian Serb military positions, everybody went to the bargaining table. So let’s keep that precedent in mind. And let’s remember that we did first try negotiation. The Clinton administration had been negotiating with the Milosevic regime consistently since 1995. LAWSON: I disagree absolutely. I think that Clinton never used his strong tools for negotiation. Among other things, it seems to me that he could, long ago, have gone himself to Belgrade to have conversations there, directly. He could have, long ago, seen to it that Yeltsin, or someone high up in the Russian government, joined with him to go there. So I don’t think the negotiation options have been used at all. I think that they’ve been very secondary. I further feel that it is typical of white-male power structures that you make the women and the children do the major suffering, and then you pretend you have altruistic ends. This conflict has destroyed hundreds of thousands of people, and that is too high a price. We are destroying the future, not creating the possibility of a new future. HASANI: Reverend, with all due respect, I think you should know Milosevic a little bit better. Just read a little about him, you will see, this is not a guy you can simply negotiate with. LAWSON: I think Milosevic is a terrible man. But I do not think he’s any worse than some other people in the whole scene who also have their own purposes in mind. WEEKLY: What about the notion that the bombing is having the desired effect? STEEL: The bombing has not been effective. We’ve been bombing Iraq for eight years with no effect ã whatsoever on Saddam Hussein. I think it’s a cowardly policy designed, not to end the war in Kosovo, but to demonstrate American leadership of NATO and NATO solidarity. The Europeans go along with it because they don’t want to defy the United States, but they’re unwilling to do more. If we’re interested in some kind of solution that’s going to aid the people on the ground, then we should probably suspend the bombing of Serbia. If there’s going to be bombing anywhere, it should be in Kosovo. This is where the Serb forces are doing things we don’t like. To bomb sites in Serbia and kill Serbian civilians, which simply increases the support for Milosevic is a totally false and deceptive and irrelevant policy.

Ultimately, these people are going to have to live together in some way. They cannot live under a permanent international police force. They’ve lived together in various ways and with considerable violence, sometimes, and intermarriage, other times, for centuries. They have to find a way of living together. We can help them find this, but I don’t think that we have a solution for it. All we can do is perhaps try to separate the contending forces until some kind of accommodation is fashioned. Just as the French and the Algerians ultimately reached an accommodation based upon mutual interests, this will happen here.

STONE: This is not about the abilities of people to live together. It’s not about civil wars or millennial hatreds. It’s about a political regime in Belgrade that uses hypernationalism, xenophobia and war to hold power. This war serves Milosevic and his political elite. And, I think, the responsibility has to be put at his feet. WEEKLY:Should the proper goal of the war be to remove Milosevic? STONE: There will be no democracy and civility in the region . . . HASANI: Until Milosevic is dead. WIENER: Two years ago, there were more than 100,000 Serbs demonstrating against Milosevic in downtown Belgrade. Those people have now fallen silent, and are supporting their nation, which they see being attacked by a great foreign power. What we are doing is counterproductive. There was a democratic opposition to Milosevic. We’ve killed that. MIJOJLIC: Semidemocratic opposition. Let me make it clear that, if I’m against the bombing, I am not pro-Milosevic. Because of that man, I had to leave my country. I just don’t believe that killing civilians will help other civilians. WEEKLY: I’d be curious to hear also from Peter about whether your friends in Serbia who used to oppose Milosevic are now rallying behind him. ANTONIJEVIC: Many of my friends were people who were against the war in Bosnia. They were all on the streets rallying against Milosevic at one point. Now, though, with bombs falling, they are all behind him, because — right or wrong — they all feel that he’s defending them against United States aggression. That’s a fact. It’s become increasingly difficult for anyone over there with different thoughts about how to resolve the problem to speak openly. Not only would that person be forbidden to speak, but that person, waking up in the morning after a night of bombing, may have second thoughts.